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FOREWORD
Egypt has long been a leader of the Arab world or
at least aspired to be one at various times in its modern
history. This leadership quest stems from its position
as the most populous Arab country centered in the
heart of the region, its geography nestled between the
Mediterranean and Red Seas with the vital Suez Canal
connecting them, its closeness (literally and figuratively) to the Israeli-Palestinian scene, and its relative
proximity to the Gulf region. Moreover, Egypt boasts
longstanding intellectual centers (religious and secular), has an educated strata of respected professionals,
as well as a highly competent diplomatic corps and
military establishment.
Since 2011, however, Egypt has generally focused
inward as it had to cope with turbulent political and
economic developments arising in large part because
of the fallout from the Arab Spring. It is currently facing a number of challenges, such as a stubborn terrorism problem that is chiefly based in the Sinai region, and economic austerity measures. Nevertheless,
Egypt has faced similar problems before, and there is
a good chance it will overcome these hurdles. If and
when Egypt does so, it is likely to resume its quest for
Arab leadership once again.
Gregory Aftandilian, an expert on the Middle East
with extensive academic and government experience,
examines Egypt’s chances to rebound from its current
difficulties and take on the Arab leadership mantle.
He argues that such a leadership role will be generally beneficial for U.S. policy, because Egypt can be a
reassuring presence for Gulf Arab states and can come
to their aid in times of crisis, help to dampen sectarian conflicts in the region, and work to discredit the
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extremist ideologies of groups like the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda, and their affiliates.
Mr. Aftandilian also suggests ways that U.S. civilian and military officials can assist Egypt to overcome
its present difficulties and play a leadership role in the
region that would be mutually beneficial.
The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings
in this monograph will be of assistance to U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army officers as they envision the
strategic outlook of the Middle East region in several
years’ time and seek ways to bolster the important
relationship between the United States and Egypt.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph’s research, completed in August
2016, analyzes the potential for Egypt to resume an
Arab leadership role that has been in abeyance for
several years because of its turbulent domestic scene.
The monograph also assesses whether or not such
a role would be beneficial for U.S. policy. Although
there has been a change in U.S. leadership since then,
the situation in Egypt has remained the same.
The monograph first explores why Egypt has long
pursued a leadership role in its modern history and
the benefits—political, economic, and strategic—that
have accrued from it. Although, by the late era of
the Hosni Mubarak presidency, Egypt was no longer
playing such a role, and the subsequent years of the
so-called Arab Spring and the turmoil that followed
compelled Egypt to look inward, Egyptian officials
have not given up hope that their country will once
again take up the Arab leadership mantle.
Egypt’s large population, geographical position,
intellectual institutions and traditions, and diplomatic
and military capabilities have convinced its officials
and segments of the intelligentsia that it is only a
matter of time until Egypt will bounce back from its
current domestic challenges and seek regional leadership again. However, these challenges are formidable. Egypt’s government has pursued authoritarian
policies that have restricted the avenues of dissent; the
economy is going through a major reform process that
has resulted in austerity measures, which have led to
price rises for food and fuel; and terrorists have continued to be active in the Sinai Peninsula and—to a
lesser extent—in mainland Egypt, curtailing tourism
and foreign investment.
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Egypt has received a windfall of economic aid from
Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf Arab countries since
the summer of 2013, when the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Mohammad Morsi was overthrown by the military
with substantial public backing. However, this assistance has diminished due to economic constraints in
these countries as well as some political tensions that
have arisen between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Hence, Egypt, even though it continues to be supported by the United States, the European Union (EU),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other
international financial institutions, will have to rely
chiefly on its own capabilities to emerge from its present difficulties. The good news for Egypt is that it has
faced similar difficulties in the past and has bounced
back from them. If Egypt sticks to its economic reform
efforts, defeats the terrorists in the Sinai, and becomes
less repressive—a democratic government is not likely
anytime soon—it indeed has the potential to stabilize
politically, economically, and strategically and again
turn its attention to the region, more so than it has
been doing in recent years.
This monograph argues that an Egyptian regional
leadership role can help to dampen many of the crises
facing the Arab world. One of the most serious of such
crises is the Sunni-Shia conflict that has been exacerbated by the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry. As a state that
does not place religion at the forefront of its foreign
policy, Egypt, while a mostly Sunni Muslim country,
is not interested in pursuing a sectarian agenda. Although it is part of the Saudi-led coalition that came to
the aid of the Yemeni Government against the Houthi
rebels, who have been backed to some degree by Iran,
Egypt is weary about being bogged down in what has
become a nasty sectarian war. And while it sees Iran as
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a potentially long-term threat, Egypt is not as fixated
on Iran as is Saudi Arabia, and Egypt could even use
its diplomatic capabilities to ease tensions between the
two major countries facing off in the Gulf, as well as
between various Sunni and Shia groups. At the same
time, Egypt, as an Arab leader, could offer to put its
military at the ready in case Saudi Arabia feels threatened. There is precedence for such a role (the first Gulf
war of 1990-1991) and, in the meantime, Egypt could
also offer to undertake more joint military training
exercises with Saudi Arabia.
As a moderate Sunni Muslim state, Egypt could
also play a role, which it has done to some extent already, in leading an ideological campaign against the
extremist ideologies of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda, and like-minded groups. Saudi
Arabia, by contrast, because it is wedded to the more
fundamentalist Wahhabi interpretations of Islam,
cannot play this role. Egypt’s famous Al-Azhar University has begun the process of presenting a counter-narrative to extremist ideologies, and much of the
Arab world could benefit from its policies that would
be further enhanced if and when Egypt returns to a
regional leadership role. Some senior U.S. officials understand that defeating groups like ISIS is not just a
military matter, but involves a long-term ideological
struggle that only moderate Sunni Muslim governments and their institutions can play.
While the United States should welcome a regional
leadership role for Egypt, there may be cases where
the two countries do not see eye-to-eye. Differences
over Libya, for example, have already come to the
fore, with Cairo supporting Libyan strongman General Khalifa Haftar in the eastern part of the country,
while the United States and many members of the

xiii

international community see Haftar as a divisive figure and instead support the concept of a unity government that would bring together Libya’s two main
rival camps.
As Egypt overcomes its domestic challenges and
moves toward a regional leadership role, this monograph argues for keeping, not cutting, U.S. military assistance, which will show the Egyptian leadership and
the Egyptian people that the United States stands with
them against terrorism. Such a policy of maintaining
military aid levels of $1.3 billion a year also provides
the United States with some leverage that it can use
to persuade Egypt to adopt more effective counterterrorism techniques and perhaps pursue less repressive
policies against political dissidents.
This monograph argues the case for more economic assistance to Egypt than the current, relatively low
amount (about $150 million annually) that is provided
now. Even though the current climate in Washington
may not be conducive to an increase in aid, a compelling case can be made to Congress that such assistance, especially as Egypt pursues difficult economic
reform measures, would be in the strategic interest
of the United States, given Egypt’s pivotal role in the
region. Positive conditionality—giving more aid
for progress on democratic norms—as opposed to
punitive measures, such as cutting aid, is likely to
be more effective when dealing with an ancient and
proud country like Egypt.
To enhance this partnership, this monograph also
argues for the resumption of the Bright Star military
exercises that have been suspended for many years
and for more interactions between the officer corps of
both countries (to include expanded exercises with the
Gulf Arab countries); while Egypt tries to diminish
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and ultimately defeat terrorists on its soil and seeks to
assure its allies in the region that it can come to their
defense when needed.
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CAN EGYPT LEAD THE ARAB WORLD AGAIN?
ASSESSING OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY
Egypt, the most populous and arguably the most
influential country in the region, has long sought a
leadership role in the Arab world. Although it has not
always succeeded in this quest, and at times had quite
a few detractors who challenged this bid for leadership, it has been keen to exert its influence beyond its
borders.1
Since 2011, which marked the so-called Arab
Spring revolution in Egypt that led to the resignation
of its longtime president, Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has
been gripped with domestic problems and upheavals, involving the political, economic, and security
spheres. This attention to domestic matters has necessarily compelled Egypt to look inward to deal with
these problems, leaving the Arab world leadershiprole to others, namely Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE).
Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt nonetheless has tried to exert a more prominent role in
Arab affairs both to heighten Egypt’s prestige in the
region and to accrue some benefits from that role for
its people and economy. This quest has had mixed
results.
For example, at the Arab League summit hosted by
Egypt in March of 2015, el-Sisi proposed a joint Arab
defense force that would presumably be deployed to
go after the so-called Islamic State and its affiliates
as well as like-minded terrorist groups.2 Although
this proposal was well-received when it was first announced, nothing has come of it, probably because
of the difficulties involved in setting up such a force,
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rivalries within the Arab world about who should
lead such a force, and some distrust among Arab Shia
that the force might become a Sunni force that would
be used in sectarian warfare.
In addition, Egypt has tried to play a prominent
role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, given that
the United States, after some strenuous attempts during the course of the previous Obama administration,
has largely retreated from the scene. Cairo has been
trying to reach out to the Israeli Government of Prime
Minister Netanyahu in order to restart a process with
the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, President of the
Palestinian Authority,3 but given the right-wing
structure of the current Israeli Government and its
reticence to make territorial compromises, along with
ongoing divisions among the Palestinians between
Fatah (Mahmoud Abbas’s party) and Hamas (the Islamist group in charge of the Gaza Strip), it is far from
certain anything will come from this outreach except
for more Egyptian-Israeli cooperation in combating
terrorist groups in the Sinai.4
Hence, at least for the moment (2016), Egypt does
not seem to be a leader in the Arab world, or at least
one that can achieve tangible benefits. For the time
being, then, Egypt will be concentrating on domestic
issues, such as efforts to defeat terrorists in the Sinai
and in other parts of Egypt, trying to shore up its moribund economy (negotiations are underway for a $12
billion International Monetary Fund [IMF] loan), and
trying to manage a political scene in which there is increasing criticism of President el-Sisi and his policies.
Nonetheless, Egypt has the potential to turn these
problems around (helped by its own economic reforms, international support, and new gas discoveries off its Mediterranean coast) even if it remains an
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authoritarian state, as is likely. If it actually succeeds
in doing so, there is a very good possibility that it will
resume its quest for Arab leadership. Hence, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for the day when Egypt
makes a concerted effort to regain the Arab leadership
mantle.
WHY IS ARAB LEADERSHIP IMPORTANT FOR
EGYPT?
The question arises as to why Egypt cares so much
about being a leader in the Arab world. After all, such
a position carries with it challenges and responsibilities that are not always beneficial for the country.
Part of its desire stems from Egypt’s history as one
of the world’s oldest nation-states. Egyptians are very
comfortable as to who they are, and they have a strong
sense of their national identity. This identity, however,
runs up against a larger Arab and Muslim identity, as
the population speaks Arabic and is roughly 90 percent
Muslim. Moreover, Egypt has and continues to play a
prominent role in Islamic history and hosts Al-Azhar,
the longest standing and leading religious university
in the Sunni Muslim world, as well as other Islamic
institutions. Moreover, with the notable exception of
the immediate years after the Israeli-Egyptian peace
treaty in 1979, when Egypt was ostracized in the Arab
world, Cairo has long hosted the Arab League and, by
tradition, the Secretary General of this institution has
usually been an Egyptian.5
Perhaps more important than these identities
are Egypt’s rich intellectual traditions. Although
the country suffers from high poverty and illiteracy
rates—about 25 percent of the population is considered poor, and around the same percentage cannot
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read or write—its intellectuals, academic institutions,
think tanks, and professional associations are widely
admired throughout much of the Arab world. Moreover, what happens in Egypt—politically and socially—is followed closely by intellectuals and political
activists throughout the Arab region.
As a former Egyptian diplomat put it:
Egypt needs to regain its self-confidence and remember that its leadership in the Arab world was, for
decades, predicated on intellectual capital and the
dominance of Egyptian scholars and experts in fields
ranging from political through to economic policy to
culture and education.6

Egyptians are prideful that the Arab world’s first
parliament, first modern army, first national secular
universities, and first professional organization were
all founded in their country. The Egyptian Bar Association, for example, was established in 1913. In addition, Egypt’s nationalist undertakings against colonialism—such as the Urabi revolt of the early 1880s,
the 1919 revolution against the British, which led to
nominal independence in 1922, and the nationalization
of the British and French owned Suez Canal Company
in 1956—were a source of inspiration and emulation
for other nationalist movements in the Arab world.
This storied history and standing has given Egypt a
special place in the region.7
Outside of this intellectual and political weight is
Egypt’s geographic location and size (about 90 million
people). For example, Egypt straddles the African and
Asian continents, and its Suez Canal remains an important international transit way from the Red Sea to
the Mediterranean not only for oil tankers from the
Persian Gulf headed to Europe but for other worldwide maritime trade.8
4

Also geographically important is Egypt’s position as being on the same latitude as the Persian Gulf,
which means in times of crisis, it is a bridge for outside powers, chiefly the United States, to use Egypt as
an overflight route and refueling stop on the way to
the Gulf. This was especially the case in the Gulf war
of 1990-1991.9
Geography is a mixed blessing for Egypt, however, as it borders both Israel and the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip. This means that Egypt has been
directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (in both
wars and in various incarnations of the peace process)
since the conflict erupted as a regional issue in the late
1940s.
Up through the 1973 war, Egypt’s position next to
Israel meant that the Arab world saw Egypt as the primary military power that would confront Israel. After
the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty of 1979, Egypt used its location
next to Israel, with the help of the United States, to
retrieve its Sinai territory from the Israelis and pursue
a diplomatic offensive, as opposed to a military one,
on behalf of the Palestinians.10
Although, as mentioned earlier, Egypt was ostracized in the Arab world for these peace deals with Israel, over time the Arab world accepted Egypt back
to the fold, helped in part by the realization that diplomacy, not war, would be the only realistic route
to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace settlement and some
type of justice for the Palestinians.
This process has not been smooth, however, as
several small wars between Israel and Arab parties
have taken place since 1973, including ones involving
Lebanon (first by Israel against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then Israel against Hezbol-
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lah) and later involving Israeli versus Hamas, which
controls the Gaza Strip.
Throughout these engagements, Egypt has had
to maneuver between keeping its peace treaty with
Israel intact while exhibiting sympathy for the Arab
cause, particularly with the Palestinians. During various flare-ups, Egypt has recalled its ambassador from
Tel Aviv but has not broken diplomatic relations with
Israel.
More positively, when the peace process seemed
to pick up momentum, Egypt portrayed itself as a depository of knowledge for the Arabs as to how to negotiate with the Israelis, and was a conduit to convey
Arab concerns to both the United States and Israel.
Hence, during various attempts at peace, Cairo was
often the stop not only for U.S. diplomats working the
peace process but also for various Arab parties, and
particularly the Palestinians, who sought Egypt’s support and advice.11
In this way, Egypt often furthered its leadership
quest in the Arab world by becoming an indispensable player in the peace process.
Nonetheless, Egypt during the Mubarak era never
matched the prominence it had during the Nasser era,
particularly from 1956 to 1967, when the country was
the undisputed leader of the Arab world. Much of the
latter was based on the charisma of Egyptian leader
Gamal Abdel Nasser and the appeal of pan-Arab nationalism that he espoused. Moreover, Nasser’s defiance of Britain and France during the Suez crisis of
1956 and later against the United States, along with
his militancy against Israel, proved widely popular
among the Arab masses.12
After the humiliating Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, during which the Egyptian military

6

suffered heavy losses and Israel occupied the Sinai
Peninsula, Nasserism lost its luster and Egypt’s position in the region declined accordingly. Egypt, under
Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, regained its leadership role again to some degree immediately after the
1973 Arab-Israeli war when offensive military actions
by Egypt and Syria took the Israelis by surprise and
inflicted substantial losses on them. Although the Israelis were able to launch successful counterattacks
during the last phases of the war before a ceasefire
was declared, the war, and the subsequent Arab oil
embargo on the United States and much of Europe,
proved to be a great psychological boost to the Arabs
and enhanced Egypt’s prestige and leadership role in
the Arab world.13 Egypt also benefitted by an infusion
of Saudi and other Gulf Arab financial aid in the aftermath of the 1973 war.
This leadership role under Sadat was short-lived,
however, because of Sadat’s peace overtures to the Israelis that ultimately culminated in the Camp David
Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
of 1979. Most countries of the Arab League, seeing that
Egypt had opted out of the military equation against
Israel, broke diplomatic relations with it as a result,
and Egypt was ostracized in the region for a time. Sadat appeared dismissive of these actions by the Arab
states, and increasingly relied on the United States as
Egypt’s military and economic benefactor.
Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, pursued a twotrack policy—maintaining close relations with the
United States (and adhering to the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty) while slowly improving relations with
the Arab world. A series of events—regionally and
internationally—helped Egypt achieve these goals.
First, the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war took
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Arab attention away from the Arab-Israeli dispute for
a time and allowed Egypt to come to Iraq’s aid with
military equipment, supplies, and Egyptian workers,
showing that it was an important power in support
of the Arab world. Second, the realization in the Arab
world that the Arab-Israeli dispute was not going to
be solved militarily, and that, with the end of the Cold
War, the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) was
not going to be the arms supplier of the Arabs that
it once was. And third, the second Gulf war that began with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought
Egypt to prominence as the dominant Arab country
in the anti-Iraq coalition, leading the Arab League to
condemn the invasion of Kuwait and contributing
the largest number of Arab forces (30,000 troops) to
the defense of Saudi Arabia, which was immediately
threatened by that invasion.14
At the end of this war, with Iraq under Saddam
Hussein considerably weaker and under international
sanctions, Egypt attempted to restore its leadership
role in the Arab world. The Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia
strategic triangle that was in place during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war re-emerged with the war against Iraq in
1990-1991, with Egypt playing a strong role in it. Once
again, Egypt received substantial Saudi and Gulf Arab
aid, and more Egyptian workers were able to obtain
employment in the Gulf Arab countries.
As a consequence, Egypt attempted to distance itself from some U.S. policies in the area to shore up its
Arab nationalist credentials, namely coming to the aid
(at least rhetorically) of Libya against Western sanctions, championing the Palestinian cause against the
Israelis, and criticizing strikes on Iraq as an example of
excessive Western punishment, which it claimed were
hurting the Iraqi people as opposed to the regime.15
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These policies and positions did bring Egypt some
benefits in the Arab world, such as Libya taking in
about 1 million Egyptian workers, helping to alleviate
the excess labor problem in Egypt, and making Cairo
the indisputable capital for Arab-Israeli peace process
meetings and consultations.
However, Mubarak never had the charisma of
Nasser, nor the daring of Sadat, who once said he preferred “action to reaction.”16 During the mid-1990s,
moreover, Egypt also had to deal with a serious internal terrorism problem from the Islamic Group and the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad that targeted regime officials,
police officers, and foreign tourists, which occupied
much of the government’s attention.17
Hence, while Egypt under Mubarak tried to seize
the Arab leadership mantle and was successful to
some degree, he never achieved (or came close to) the
level that Nasser achieved in the years of 1956-1967.
EGYPT’S ARAB LEADERSHIP QUEST UNDER
ABDEL FATTAH EL-SISI
As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian revolution
and the ouster of Mubarak compelled the first two
successor regimes to look inward for the most part.
After Mubarak resigned in February 2011, power
passed to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF). As novices in politics (the Egyptian military
had not really played a role in domestic politics since
the 1960s), they had to contend with contentious
politics, numerous demonstrations, and an economy
that had been battered because of the revolutionary
turmoil in the country. The SCAF employed military
tribunals against supposed violators of the law that
contributed to their loss of popularity over time. The
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next phase was the Muslim Brotherhood era, which
started in early 2012 with the organization winning
control of parliament through elections (though this
parliament was disbanded by the courts in mid-2012)
and the emergence of Muhammad Morsi from the
Brotherhood as Egypt’s new president in the summer
of 2012. Although Morsi attempted to change Egypt’s
foreign policy to some degree—by warming relations
with Iran, expressing solidarity with the Syrian rebels fighting the Assad government, and showing solidarity with Hamas—the basic contours of Egyptian
foreign policy were not really altered. For example,
Egypt brokered a truce between Israel and Hamas in
November 2012 in the wake of another in their series
of small wars, and maintained close relations with the
United States.18
Like the SCAF, Morsi had to deal with mounting domestic troubles in Egypt, some of which were
of his own making, such as his late-November 2012
decree declaring that his presidential decisions would
no longer be subject to judicial review (setting himself
above the law) and his efforts to push through a new
constitution that was written primarily by his fellow
Muslim Brothers.
These decisions provoked a secular backlash in
Egypt that led to street battles between Morsi’s supporters and opponents, and a genuine popular revolt
against him that was supported by the Egyptian military, led by then-Defense Minister el-Sisi, who ousted
Morsi in early July 2013.19
Although el-Sisi put the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, nominally in charge
of the country, he and the military hierarchy were the
real powers in charge of Egypt from that point on. This
situation has continued to the present day, though
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el-Sisi, who retired from the military, ran successfully
for president as a civilian in 2014.
Initially, el-Sisi had to deal with the threat from the
Muslim Brothers, which called for Morsi to be restored
to power and pledged they would not relinquish their
protest encampments in the Cairo area until that was
achieved. El-Sisi answered this demand by using force
against the Brotherhood and its allies. Nearly 1,000
people died in the month of August 2013 alone when
he ordered troops and police to crush these encampments, and he imprisoned hundreds of Brotherhood
leaders and activists. In December 2013, the government declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization, cracked down on their non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and businesses, and ensured it would
not come back to power through the ballot box. El-Sisi
also had to deal with a terrorist insurgency in the Sinai
that broke out in earnest after Morsi was overthrown
as well as terrorist attacks in mainland Egypt.20
Despite these domestic problems and the fracturing of the anti-Morsi coalition as the new regime began
to go after secular detractors, el-Sisi, at least initially,
fashioned himself as a new Nasser. This meant that
he would not only embark on big projects domestically (like building an extension of the Suez Canal),
but would play a prominent role in Arab affairs.
Such leadership attempts have been problematic.
El-Sisi, for example, proposed the idea of a joint Arab
defense force at the Arab League summit he hosted in
March 2015. He said that the Arab nation was facing
unprecedented challenges (a reference to the rise of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] and like-minded
terrorist groups) and that Arab problems should be
handled by Arabs themselves. Although the idea for
such a force was endorsed at that summit and there
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were subsequent meetings of Arab military chiefs in
subsequent months to explore the idea, nothing came
of it. Indeed, at the most recent Arab League summit
in Mauritania in July 2016, there was no mention of
such a force.21
At the same time, there was some coordinated Arab
military action led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthi
rebels in Yemen who adhere to the Zaidi branch of
Shia Islam and had ousted the Yemeni Government
from the capital city of Sana. A number of Arab countries contributed military assets to supporting this
Saudi-led effort (in large part to stay in the good graces of the Saudis), but it soon became apparent that the
Saudis and the Emirates were taking the lead in this
military effort and were conducting the brunt of the
air strikes. Egypt did deploy some naval ships to the
strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of Yemen
(the important sea lane that links the Red and Arabian Seas) and reportedly conducted some air strikes
in probable coordination with the Egyptian navy, but
it was clearly not the dominant military player in this
conflict.
Egypt lent its military assets to this effort in large
part to stay in the good graces of the Saudis who came
to the Egyptian Government’s aid with billions of dollars after Morsi was overthrown. (Although Saudi Arabia had given sanctuary over the years to the Muslim
Brotherhood during periodic crackdowns in Egypt, it
had come to see the organization as not only a threat
to Egypt but to their own country as well. Hence,
there was a convergence of interests between Egypt
and Saudi Arabia.) Egypt also had a strategic interest
in the Yemeni conflict because it did not want the war
to interfere with the free passage of ships through the
Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as that would adversely affect
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shipping (and toll revenues) through its Suez Canal.
However, Egypt, with an unhappy history of military
intervention in Yemen in the 1960s, during which it
suffered many casualties, was especially careful not
to send ground troops to Yemen in order not to be
bogged down in that country again.22
The Egyptian-Saudi relationship also had some
differences over Syria that has not disappeared. Although many Egyptian officials do not have a high
regard for Bashar Assad, the president of Syria, believing he is not the sharp and shrewd leader that his
father, Hafez, was, they believe the alternative to his
rule could be radical Islamist groups like the al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-Nusra (now called Jabhat Fateh
al-Sham) and ISIS. Cairo is fearful that if such groups
come out on top of the Syrian civil war and rule the
Syrian state, that scenario would be a disaster for both
the region and for Egypt, because an Islamist victory
in Syria would work to destabilize the region, give
hope to the repressed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
organization, and give even more impetus to Egypt’s
own Islamist terrorists in the Sinai and elsewhere in
the country.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, sees Bashar Assad
and his regime as the real problem in Syria and believes he should step down immediately. Moreover,
the Saudis have been aiding Islamist groups within the
Syrian rebel camp that the Egyptians see as extremist.
In addition, even though Egypt and Saudi Arabia are
both opposed to ISIS, Egypt seems to be concerned
about Saudi Arabia’s plans for Syria if Saudi Arabia
continues to aid such Islamist groups. Egypt seems to
believe the Saudis are overly optimistic that they can
control and tame these Islamist groups.23
Concerning Iran, Egypt sees that country as a longterm strategic threat, but it is not as paranoid about
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Iran as is Saudi Arabia.24 Relations between Egypt and
Iran were poor during the Mubarak era (not helped
by the fact that Iran named a street in Tehran after one
of Sadat’s assassins), but occasionally Mubarak would
send signals to Iran of a warming of ties when he felt
that he wanted to tweak the United States over policy
disagreements. Under Morsi, ties with Iran improved
somewhat, marked by presidential visits to each
other’s capitals, but there was some tension in the
relationship over Syria because Morsi disapproved
of Tehran’s assistance to the Assad government and
even seemed to encourage Egyptians to volunteer to
fight against Assad.25
On Libya, Egypt also appears to have differences
with a number of Arab countries. After Muammar
Qadhafi’s regime was overthrown and Qadhafi was
killed, Libya descended into a long period of chaos
with militias proliferating and two rival governments
being established—one in Tripoli under Islamists
somewhat akin to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
and one in Tobruk under secular elements. In this
chaos, ISIS was able to establish a foothold in some
central coastal cities of the country, like Sirte. Much
of the Arab world and the international community
have now come to support a national unity government—essentially a merger of the Tripoli and Tobruk
factions—and a new national army, but Egypt (and the
UAE) have strongly supported the Tobruk faction and
the commander of forces loyal to this faction, General
Khalifa Haftar, who remains deeply distrustful of the
Tripoli faction.26
Egypt sees Libya, its western neighbor, as a national security problem because of the smuggling of
weapons and terrorists across the border into Egypt,
and believes only a strongman like Haftar, with Egyp-
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tian help, can control and stabilize the situation. This
support for Haftar, however, is prolonging the process (and may indeed scuttle it) of achieving a national
unity government, destroying ISIS’s strongholds in
the country, and reining in the militias. As of late August 2016, the Tobruk faction has refused to endorse
the unity government, putting the unity concept—and
Libya’s future—in jeopardy.27
Finally, Egypt has tried to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process track by maintaining good relations with both the Israeli government under Prime
Minister Netanyahu and the Palestinian Authority
under Mahmoud Abbas. In July 2016, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry traveled to Israel and
the West Bank to meet both leaders. El-Sisi reportedly
has a good relationship with Netanyahu in large part
because they have cooperated on security issues in the
Sinai, which has involved the sharing of intelligence
on the terrorists, and maintaining a tough position
against Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Egypt has destroyed numerous tunnels between
the Sinai and Gaza that were used to smuggle arms
and terrorists back and forth.28
Egypt believes the Israeli-Palestinian track is its
strong suit because of its longstanding ties to the Palestinians and its peace treaty with the Israelis. Showing that it is concerned about the Palestinians—the
core issue in the Middle East despite the proxy wars
between Saudi Arabia and Iran that have arisen in the
past few years—gives it a certain amount of prestige
in the Arab world. However, pursuing this track under the present circumstances has risks because it is
doubtful that Israel’s right-wing government will be
able to meet Palestinian demands, namely relinquishing the West Bank and East Jerusalem to allow them to
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create a viable state. Moreover, given the split in territory and ideology between Fatah (the political force
of the Palestinian Authority) and Hamas (considered
a terrorist group by Israel, the United States, and
the European Union [EU]), it is unrealistic to expect
that Hamas would sit idly by and not scuttle a deal
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.29
On the issue of counter radicalization, Egypt under el-Sisi has tried to use Egypt’s religious institutions to counter the narrative of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and
like-minded groups. In a major speech in January
2015, el-Sisi called on Egyptian religious leaders in AlAzhar and the Ministry of Religious Affairs to provide
guidance that supports a moderate interpretation of
Islamic texts while refuting the extremists who have
cited certain texts as justifications for their violence
and intolerant behavior.30
EGYPT’S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
AND POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE
Egypt under el-Sisi has become an authoritarian
state, assisted in part by a state-run media campaign
that is hypernationalistic and questions the patriotism
of anyone who disagrees with the president.31 Part
of this strategy is to rally the population around the
leader; the other part is to blame foreigners or foreign conspiracies for Egypt’s ills. El-Sisi was initially
widely popular with a large majority of Egyptians after he removed Morsi from power and cracked down
on the Brotherhood organization. Non-Brotherhood
Egyptians—probably three-fourths of the population
according to some estimates—came to see the Brotherhood as a threat to not only Egypt’s semi-democratic traditions but also to its mostly socially tolerant
society.32
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Politically, however, el-Sisi has been more interested in consolidating power (by keeping his enemies,
real and imagined, either imprisoned or off-balanced)
and dealing with a serious terrorist insurgency in the
North Sinai and terrorist attacks in mainland Egypt.33
He fulfilled the so-called democratic roadmap that he
promised the Egyptian people and the international
community after he removed Morsi from power—
drafting and passing a new constitution, and holding
presidential and parliamentary elections—but toleration of dissent has been very problematic.34
It is not just Brotherhood leaders and activists who
are in jail, but some secular journalists, bloggers, human rights activists, and protestors. El-Sisi’s critics
are often tarnished with the label of “traitor” by regime supporters, and some civil society activists are
accused of conspiring with foreigners aiming to bring
down the Egyptian state.35
Parliament, meanwhile, has essentially become
a rubber stamp institution, with members outdoing
each other in espousing pro-el-Sisi sentiments. Although el-Sisi has not created a regime political party
like his predecessors, a broad, pro-el-Sisi coalition
has formed in parliament that ensures the passage of
regime-directed legislation.
El-Sisi, like his predecessors, also has little tolerance for personal criticism. In a televised speech in
2016, he told Egyptian citizens: “Do not listen to anyone but me.”36 He seems to hold the view that his critics are out to harm Egypt.
There are, however, some glimmers of hope
that Egypt could become less authoritarian and less
repressive. Despite large-scale arrests, some civil society and human rights activists along with independent journalists have continued to speak up and have
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put the spotlight on regime repression. In addition,
there have been a handful of parliamentarians who
refuse to be in lockstep with el-Sisi and have voiced
opposition to his policies. Perhaps in response to this
pressure, el-Sisi stated in August 2016 that he would
soon pardon 300 detainees.37
Part of the problem is that the state institutions
that supported the Mubarak presidency were never
really purged of abusive officials who supported state
authoritarianism. These institutions include the military, the interior ministry (which controls the police
and the internal security services), and the judiciary.
All of these institutions are playing a role in the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and are helping to
maintain el-Sisi in power.38 They also have some deep
grudges against the Brotherhood and operate as their
own fiefdoms. Hence, el-Sisi seems beholden to them
and, therefore, may believe that any major reform
effort would jeopardize his own hold on power.
For example, Morsi, while he was in power, saw
the judiciary as a thorn in his side (the Supreme Constitutional Court, for instance, disbanded the Brotherhood-dominated parliament in June 2012 over a technicality) and a holdover from the Mubarak regime.
He tried to lower the retirement age for judges that
would have removed about 20 percent of them. Presumably, he would then fill the vacancies with Brotherhood supporters. Hence, when Morsi was overthrown, some judges issued death sentence verdicts
not only against Morsi and other Brotherhood leaders
but also against numerous Brotherhood rank-and-file
activists. When Western journalists questioned el-Sisi
about these harsh verdicts after very quick trials, his
response was that he could not interfere in the workings of the judiciary—a comment that might not be
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too far from the truth because he feared upsetting this
important branch of the government and a key ally in
his anti-Brotherhood campaign.39
Similarly, the case of a murdered Italian graduate student, Giulio Regeni, who was doing research
in Egypt on labor issues, might be illustrative of the
theory that el-Sisi does not fully control the government and needs to cater to the interior ministry. Although this case is still not solved, the student’s body,
found on a roadside in February 2016, reportedly had
markings of torture.40 So far, no one has been held
accountable. It is highly doubtful that el-Sisi himself
would have ordered the student’s arrest or death, as
it has become a crisis in Egypt’s relations with Italy, a
major trading partner. Instead, it is quite possible that
some official in the interior ministry deemed Regeni a
threat to national security because he was researching
a supposedly sensitive subject and ordered his arrest
and torture without checking with the president’s office. El-Sisi, while worried about the bad atmospherics of this incident, seems reluctant to “clean house”
in the interior ministry. The most he has done is to
compel his interior minister to apologize to the Egyptian people for police abuses in general, but only a few
police officers have been prosecuted by the government for abuses against citizens.41 Indeed, in the antiterrorism law that was decreed by President el-Sisi in
August 2015, and passed by the Egyptian parliament
in January 2016, police are shielded from penalties for
“proportionate use of force,” and journalists can be
prosecuted for writing articles on terrorism incidents
that differ from the government’s version of events.42
There have even been reports of coup plotting in
the military and the arrests of some officers.43 These
reports, written by Egyptian journalists not tied to the
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regime, are not possible to verify, but if they are indeed
true, then el-Sisi’s grip on power may not be as strong
as some have suggested. He may feel that he needs
to indulge the military to keep it content. This means
that he will not take any steps to curb the military’s
substantial stake in the Egyptian economy, a role that
many economists believe has led to distortions in the
economy, and is hurting competition in some industries. Hence, it is doubtful that the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian state will change anytime soon.
The economy has also been a problem occupying
much of the government’s time and effort. Government projections of fairly high economic growth rates
of 5 to 6 percent have not borne out (the current rate
is between 3 to 4 percent) because of several factors.44
Ongoing terrorist incidents not only in the Sinai but
also in mainland Egypt have adversely affected foreign direct investment as well as Egyptian nationals
bringing capital back home. More directly, tourism
has taken a large hit because of terrorism. For example, the downing of a Russian Metrojet over the Sinai in late October 2015 that killed all 224 people on
board—attributed by el-Sisi to an act of terrorism—
has severely hurt the popular southern Sinai resort industry. Not only have the number of Russian tourists
dried up, but tourists from Britain and elsewhere in
Europe have also stopped traveling to Egypt in large
numbers. This decline in tourism—at least 50 percent
fewer foreign tourists in 2016 than in 2015—has not
only adversely affected gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, but has also exacerbated unemployment,
particularly for university graduates, some of whom
were able to get jobs in this industry because of their
facility with foreign languages.45
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Official unemployment in Egypt stands at 13 percent, but some economists believe this figure hides the
true jobless rate. Among university graduates, the figure is at least two to three times that rate, according to
some estimates.46
El-Sisi’s economic plan initially involved megaprojects. He used the military to create an expansion
of the Suez Canal (actually a byway that would facilitate ship transits in the canal) and completed this
project in a year’s time at a cost of about $8 billion.
But the government’s projection of a huge boost in
canal tolls (from $5 billion in 2015, to double that in
a decade) that would result from this expansion has
failed to register even modest growth in 2016 because
of the global economic downturn and subsequent
drop in maritime trade. Egypt would be lucky to even
maintain the $5 billion level in 2016, because of those
exogenous factors.47
El-Sisi had planned to create a new capital city
east of Cairo that would have been a huge, $45 billion
project, but that seems to have been shelved for the
time being. Egypt still plans to create a new economic
zone near the Suez Canal aimed at attracting foreign
and domestic businesses, but it is unclear when this
project will move forward.
The other part of his economic plan involved cutting government spending, particularly on subsidies
and civil service benefits. Subsidies currently account
for a whopping 8.5 percent of GDP. El-Sisi achieved
some success by reducing energy subsidies in his first
year as president, but then halted the effort when it
appeared other subsidy cuts would be too politically
dangerous. He has proposed a new civil service law
aimed at cutting waste and redundancy, but that bill
has encountered some resistance from members of
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parliament who are worried about the impact of such
cuts on their constituents who have seen their real
purchasing power decline amidst a relatively high
inflation of 14 percent.48
What has kept the economy afloat has been generous infusions of Gulf Arab aid since the summer of
2013, particularly from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, along with a high demand for consumer goods.
Some observers believe Gulf Arab aid has amounted
to between $20 to $30 billion since 2013, helping to
shore up Egypt’s dwindling foreign currency reserves
and mitigate the effects of its budget deficits of about
10 percent of GDP. Still, because of the large fiscal
deficits and burgeoning trade deficits (currently 7 percent of GDP), Egypt’s foreign exchange reserves have
dropped to less than $17 billion, about half of what
they were in 2010.49
CAN EGYPT TURN ITS PROBLEMATIC
DOMESTIC SITUATION AROUND AND
BECOME A REGIONAL LEADER AGAIN?
The answer to this question is yes, with caveats. It
is unlikely that Egypt, with its military-backed government and its unreformed government ministries,
will become a democracy anytime soon, but that situation has been the case for quite some time. The Nasser
years showed that authoritarianism is not an impediment to regional leadership and in some respects can
facilitate this stance as long as the domestic situation
remains under control. Like el-Sisi, Nasser cracked
down hard on the Muslim Brotherhood and had little
toleration for dissent. His secret police were active
throughout the country.50 In contrast to the present
era, Nasser was very popular with the Egyptian intelligentsia and the masses, and his prominence in
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regional affairs was a mark of pride for most Egyptians. El-Sisi was initially popular with the Egyptian
secular intelligentsia and the masses, but this popularity has slipped because of the political and economic
problems mentioned earlier.
The question arises as to whether Egypt can stabilize its domestic situation, politically and economically, to the point where it can then devote more time
and energy to pursue an Arab leadership role.
Politically, while Egypt does not have to become
a democracy to achieve this aim, it needs to be less
repressive so that its citizens can air their grievances
without fear of arrest. This policy has sometimes been
called a safety-valve approach—letting the opposition
blow off steam without fundamentally changing the
politics of the country—and was in operation throughout much of the Mubarak era, which helped the latter
survive in power for almost 30 years. Nasser did not
need to use this political mechanism because much of
Egyptian society, as some scholars have pointed out,
was willing to sacrifice political freedoms for the larger goal of the “national modernization project” that he
championed.51 After the humiliating defeat in the 1967
Arab-Israeli war, there was an increase in agitation
from some segments of Egyptian society; but for the
time when Egypt under Nasser was the undisputed
leader of the Arab world (1956-1967), Egypt’s domestic political situation was largely under control.52
This means that el-Sisi, if he remains president for
some time, has to find a way to appease the secular
opposition and activists without repression, while
retaining a semblance of popular support. Given that
his regime sees the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat, it is unlikely that he will reverse his stance
on this organization, but many, if not most, Egyptian
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secularists share his antipathy toward the Brotherhood in any case. What the secular opposition and activists want is tolerance of moderate voices critical of
the government, less repression, an end to terrorism,
and an improvement in the economy.53
Although el-Sisi has exhibited little tolerance of
criticism, that may change given some internal and
external circumstances. Internally, el-Sisi is likely to
receive continued criticism from elements of the intelligentsia as long as his government arrests protestors, journalists, civil society activists, and bloggers.
An interesting development was when protests broke
out in the wake of the Saudi king’s visit to Egypt in
June 2016, when el-Sisi’s government announced that
two islands in the Straits of Tiran (between the Sinai
and the northwestern coast of Saudi Arabia) that the
Saudis had given to Egypt in 1950, would be returned
to Saudi control. The protestors seized on this issue
as a matter of principle by claiming they were trying
to protect Egypt’s sovereignty.54 Many of the protestors undoubtedly saw an opportunity to use el-Sisi’s
hypernationalism against him as a way to embarrass
the government. In response, the government arrested
scores of protestors for violating the so-called protest
law that prohibits street demonstrations without approval from the interior ministry. However, in August
2016, el-Sisi signaled in an interview that he would
soon release those detained for these protests.55
El-Sisi might come to the realization, if he has not
already done so, that to preserve his government’s
long-term stability he may have to ease up on his intolerance of dissent, particularly if does not involve
the Brotherhood. Making Egypt less repressive would
dampen the potential for a more violent outbreak.
Even the Mubarak regime was less repressive than
the situation in Egypt today. The toleration of dissent
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would also go a long way toward stopping the erosion
of el-Sisi’s popularity.
There are foreign policy reasons for el-Sisi to become less repressive as well. Despite his flirtations
with Russia, el-Sisi keenly wants a White House visit
as a way of giving his regime a stamp of approval from
Washington.56 Former President Obama seems to have
resisted offering such an invitation because of ongoing concerns over Egypt’s poor human rights record,
even though he restored full U.S. military assistance
to Egypt in March 2015, after having suspended much
of it in October 2013. By embarking on less repressive
policies, el-Sisi would also improve his standing within the EU countries, which have also voiced concerns
about human rights, especially after the mysterious
death of the Italian graduate student Giulio Regeni, as
mentioned earlier.
This desire to be in the good graces of the United
States was evident in an August 2016 interview that
el-Sisi gave in which he said: “Egyptian-American relations are strategic and they have been improving.”
He then added: “During the past [3] years, facts about
the situation in Egypt were clarified to them, and our
policies are characterized with balance, prudence, and
keenness on such relationships.”57
Although high ranking U.S. civilian and military
leaders have come to Cairo to speak with their Egyptian interlocutors, this desire to engage with Egypt and
continue U.S. military and economic assistance stems
in large part from not wanting Egypt to fail and succumb to instability and terrorism, not because they see
an improvement in Egypt’s human rights situation.
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For example, at the time of the renewal of the U.S.
strategic dialogue with Egypt in the summer of 2015,
then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated publicly
in Cairo:
Now, we all know that defeating terrorism requires a
long-term strategy. Border security and law enforcement actions are a significant part of the equation, but
the even larger imperative is to persuade and prevent
young people from turning to terror in the first place.
Otherwise, no matter how many terrorists we bring to
justice, those groups will replenish their ranks and we
will not be safer. We will be involved in a round robin,
circular, repetitive process.
This means that our comprehensive strategy has to
earn the support of religious authorities, educators,
and citizens who discredit hateful doctrines and who
are ready and willing to build stronger and more
resilient communities. The success will depend on
building trust between the authorities and the public,
and enabling those who are critical of official policies
to find a means of voicing their dissent peacefully,
through participation in a political process. The more
united and proud of their institutions the citizens of a
country are, the more effective those institutions will
be in resisting and fighting back against the agents of
terror. This is, we have found inevitably through history, the imperative nexus between human rights and
security. And this, too, will be a major focus of our
discussions today.58

Kerry and other U.S. officials have underscored that
while support for Egypt is important strategically,
long-term success in Egypt’s fight against terrorism and in bringing about stability means finding a
“means of voicing dissent peacefully.” In other words,
the U.S. message is that repression of dissent is not
only morally wrong but also counterproductive.
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On the economic front, Egypt (as of the completion of this monograph’s research in August 2016)
has tentatively agreed to an IMF loan of some $12 billion as a way of shoring up its troubled economy and
its dwindling foreign exchange reserves. This loan
is contingent on Egypt obtaining about $9 billion in
additional loans (from development banks and from
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states), subsidy cuts on
electricity, water, and food (for the non-poor), plus the
introduction of a value-added tax to improve the government’s revenue collection and a devaluation of the
Egyptian currency to boost exports.59
Although many of these measures are controversial, Egyptian officials believe they have no choice
but to pursue them in the face of persistent budget
and trade deficits and lackluster economic growth.60
If Egypt’s tourism industry recovers, foreign investment increases, budget deficits improve, inflation is
reduced, foreign exchange reserves improve, and the
new gas find off the Mediterranean coast proves to be
as big as has been reported, Egypt has the potential
to have a stable economy, fairly high growth rates,
lower inflation, and a reduction in unemployment.
A prominent economist and former IMF official who
has followed Egypt closely has stated that although
Egypt’s economy is in poor shape, it is “not one that is
in full blown crisis,”61 meaning that it can turn things
around. Moreover, if the terrorism problem in the Sinai diminishes, and the regime becomes less repressive, Egypt’s political situation can also stabilize.
If this scenario happens, Egypt will be able to turn
its attention more toward regional matters and make
a bid to resume an Arab leadership role. What is in
Egypt’s favor is that it has dealt with political, terrorism, and economic crises before and has recovered
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from such problems. Although it is highly unlikely
that Egypt will ever become an economic powerhouse
like Dubai, it has the potential to resume the fairly
high growth rates (around 7 percent) that it achieved
in 2007-2008, if it sticks with its new economic
reform plan.
WHAT POLICIES WOULD EGYPT LIKELY
PURSUE AS AN ARAB REGIONAL LEADER?
The Arab world today is facing a number of crises; one of the most serious is the sectarian divide and
strife between Sunni and Shia. There are a number of
reasons for the emergence of this strife that go back
many centuries, but it is safe to say that Saudi-Iranian
rivalry and hostility is driving much of it. Part of the
problem is that each of these protagonists has placed
religion in the center of their regime’s ideology. Saudi
Arabia’s state ideology is the Wahhabi brand of Sunni
Islam that is an extreme interpretation of Islamic religious texts, which leaves little room for tolerance of
those not following its precepts.62 In addition, some
Wahhabi clerics have even considered the Shia to be
heretics and, therefore, not worthy of being considered as true Muslims. On the Iranian side, although
the regime, since Ayatollah Khomeini took power in
1979, espouses a type of pan-Islamic nationalism, it
is a Shia state and much of its policies in the region
are geared toward supporting Shia groups in a mostly
Sunni Arab world.63
The fact that about 10 percent of the Saudi population is Shia and have been largely relegated to secondclass status in the kingdom merely adds fuel to the
fire. The Iranians see the Saudi leadership as oppressors of the Shia (both in the kingdom and in neighbor-
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ing Bahrain), whereas the Saudi officials (and much of
Saudi society) see Iran’s hand in “stirring up” the Shia
of Saudi Arabia who live mostly in the strategically
important (because of oil) Eastern Province.64
This Saudi-Iran Sunni-Shia rivalry is not just being played out in the Gulf region (for example in
Bahrain, where a Sunni kingdom presides over, and
Iran would say oppresses, its 70 percent Shia majority
population), but in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.65
The absence of Egypt in the regional arena has
made this sectarian situation worse because religion
is not a driving force behind its foreign policy. Conversely, a more engaged Egypt is likely to dampen
such sectarian strife for the following reasons:
• Having only a miniscule Shia population, Egypt
has never felt threatened by Shia militancy fed
by Iran, real or imagined. Its sectarian problem has chiefly involved occasional MuslimChristian clashes, particularly in Upper Egypt
(Coptic Christians are about 10 percent of the
population of Egypt as a whole), but not interMuslim clashes. Although Egypt is proud to
be a majority Sunni Muslim state that houses
the prestigious Al-Azhar University (which
has trained Sunni Muslim clerics from all over
the Muslim world), it does not see the world
through sectarian Muslim lenses.
• Egypt’s problems with Iran are historical but
not religious. In modern times, Egypt and Iran
have been two regional powers in the Middle
East, and relations were not good between
them during the Nasser period when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was ruler of Iran, as they
were generally on opposite sides in the Cold
War. Relations improved during the Sadat era
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as both leaders were pro-West and opposed to
the Soviet Union. Sadat even offered the Shah
temporary sanctuary when he left Iran during
the height of the Iranian revolution in early
1979. Relations then deteriorated under Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime, especially as Iran’s revolutionary leaders seem to inspire Islamists in
the Arab world, denigrate states like Egypt that
had relations with Israel, and named a street in
Tehran after one of Sadat’s assassins.66 However, the acrimony between Egypt and Iran was
not because of the Sunni-Shia issue.
• Moreover, in part because of its distance from
Iran (in contrast to the Saudis who live just
across the Gulf from Iran), Egypt does not see
Iran as an immediate strategic military threat
and believes that the nuclear deal that was
signed by Iran and the United Nations (UN)
Security Council’s five permanent members
(China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, plus Germany [P5+1])—despite misgivings by Gulf Arab states—was a positive development.67 That is not to say that Egypt is not
concerned about Iran’s threats against the Gulf
Arab states (who are, after all, Egypt’s benefactors) in the long term, but that the threat is not
immediate or geographically close.
• However, a more prominent role by Egypt as a
bulwark of Arab security would not only lessen
the sectarian issue but would help to allay Saudi worries about a resurgent Iran. Egypt has
one of the most powerful and capable militaries
in the Arab world. Although Egypt’s estimated
defense budget of $4.4 billion is lower than that
of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Egypt’s military
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equipment of 4,800 tanks and over 1,100 aircraft and 470,000 military personnel, including
a highly trained and competent officer corps,
makes it a formidable military force.68
• Such a force can be a check on Iran’s regional
ambitions, reassuring Egypt’s Gulf Arab allies
who are worried about Tehran’s ambitions.
Indeed, Egypt has already taken part in military exercises with Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
and such exercises are likely to continue and
expand in the future.
• At the same time, Egypt can deal with Iran in
a way that Saudi Arabia cannot. Because Egypt
deals with states in a non-sectarian way, it can
also maintain relations with Iran and convey
Arab concerns even while being in a military
alliance with Saudi Arabia. During the time of
the Iran nuclear negotiations in the spring of
2015, when the Saudis were very concerned
about a deal that would leave some of Iran’s nuclear capability intact, the Egyptian and Iranian
foreign ministers had a rather friendly meeting
on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement
ministerial.69 Moreover, by avoiding inflammatory sectarian actions or language, Egypt can
avoid the pitfalls that have occurred between
Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent months. For example, when the Saudis executed a Shia cleric,
Nimr al-Nimr, in early 2016, this incident led to
street demonstrations in Tehran and the torching of the Saudi Embassy in that city. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic
relations with Iran.70 Egypt, on the other hand,
was not affected by this crisis.
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• At the same time, Egypt, as a mostly Sunni
Muslim state, can be a bulwark as a leader
disputing the extremist propaganda of ISIS, alQaeda, and like-minded groups. As mentioned
earlier, el-Sisi in January 2015 called on Egypt’s
leading Muslim leaders and clerics to go and
reexamine the Islamic texts and rid them of interpretations that are opposed to tolerance and
the modern world. He stated:
we are in need of a religious revolution. You imams
[Muslim clerics] are responsible before Allah. . . . The
entire world is waiting for your word . . . because the
Islamic world is being torn, it is being destroyed, it is
being lost . . . by our own hands.71

El-Sisi also stated:
religious discourse is the greatest battle and challenge
facing the Egyptian people. There is an urgent need
for a new vision and a modern, comprehensive understanding of the religion of Islam, rather than relying
on a discourse that has not changed for 800 years.72

In other words, el-Sisi was calling for a sort of reformation in Islam in contrast to the traditionalists who
say that the “doors to ijtihad (interpretation)” were
closed in the 9th century.
Although there is currently some tension between
Egypt’s Ministry of Religious Endowments and the
Al-Azhar University as to how to fulfill el-Sisi’s message—the former is trying to unify Friday sermons
around the country by giving imams an actual text
to recite, whereas Al-Azhar says that such a policy
“freezes” religious discourse and believes it is more
beneficial to train imams to help them avoid radical
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ideas—el-Sisi sees this effort to revitalize Islam as
probably the most important component of an effective counterterrorism campaign region-wide.73
Egypt in an Arab leadership role can lead this effort in a way that the Saudis, wedded to Wahhabi tradition, cannot. Even though the Saudis have created a
modern state with the latest Western technology, they
would be loath to talk about a reformation in Islam
for fear of unsettling their long association with the
Wahhabi clerics, which has given them legitimacy for
many decades. The alliance between the Saudi family and the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi movement, go
back to the late-18th century, long before the founding
of the Saudi state in the 1920s.
Some in the Arab world may question whether
someone like el-Sisi, who has cracked down violently
on the Muslim Brotherhood, can assume this role of
religious reformer. However, el-Sisi has said that he is
personally devout and that he believes organizations
like the Brotherhood want to politicize Islam with extremist ideas for their own purposes. He addressed
this issue head-on in his January 2015 speech in which
he said it is not the religion, but the “thinking” in this
religion that needs to be changed:
It’s inconceivable that the thinking that we hold most
sacred should cause the entire Islamic world to be a
source of anxiety, danger, killing and destruction for
the rest of the world. Impossible that this thinking—
and I am not saying the religion—I am saying this
thinking. . . . This is antagonizing the entire world. It’s
antagonizing the entire world! Does this mean that 1.6
billion people (Muslims) should want to kill the rest of
the world’s inhabitants—that is 7 billion—so that they
themselves may live? Impossible!74
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Because the battle against ISIS is not only one of
territory but of an idea, it is important that Egypt
play this role. Although polls show that a majority of
Egyptians are religious and believe Islam should play
an important role in society, a majority also believes
that neither the government, nor a political organization like the Brotherhood, should tell them how to
practice their faith or abide by various precepts. Most
Egyptians believe that the level of one’s religiosity is
a personal or family matter, and should remain so.75
In this stance they are supported by millions of other
Muslims in the Middle East. Moreover, seeing the brutality of ISIS’s so-called caliphate, and the way it has
treated women, minorities, and children has helped to
bring this moderate notion of faith forward in many
Arab circles.
The fact that Al-Azhar is considered mainstream
Sunni Islam, as opposed to the more extreme Wahhabi brand that is practiced in Saudi Arabia, means
that it can play a more constructive role in combating
the extremist ideologies of ISIS and al-Qaeda and their
affiliates. Not only can Al-Azhar be used to train Muslim clerics from countries in the region, but it can also
strategize with them about how best to weaken the
arguments of the extremists. One particularly effective tactic has been Al-Azhar-trained clerics traveling
to villages in the countryside and explaining that ISIS
ideology not only goes against mainstream Islamic
teachings, but that it also goes against the traditions
of the village that have been practiced for hundreds
of years.76
Another way that Egypt might extend its influence
is by bringing more cadets and military officers from
other Arab countries to study in its military academies
and professional military educational institutions that
are considered the most advanced in the Arab region.
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In these academies and institutions, Arab officers can
receive pilot training, and courses in combat arms and
tank warfare, for example. Such programs would not
only familiarize these cadets and officers with Egyptian military doctrine and practices, but they would
create a pool of pro-Egyptian military officers in the
region that would not only have a favorable attitude
toward Egypt, but also facilitate joint military actions
when the need arises.
HOW WOULD THIS EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP
BID IMPACT U.S. POLICIES IN THE REGION?
In most respects, having Egypt become a leader
of the Arab world again would be beneficial for U.S.
policy, particularly at this juncture when the region
is in turmoil, and U.S.-Egyptian relations have improved. As mentioned earlier, a more prominent role
for Egypt (as a friend and military protector of Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf Arab states) would lessen the
sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia, something
that would be in the U.S. interest as well.
For example, the United States not only has close
relations with Sunni regimes, but also with the Shiadominated regime of Iraq, where much U.S. blood and
treasure has been spent since 2003. An exacerbation
of the Sunni-Shia divide places the United States in a
difficult position because to take sides in such a religious dispute pits U.S. allies against one another and
is a lose-lose situation for Washington. By contrast,
a lessening of the sectarian situation between Sunni
and Shia that could come with Egypt playing a more
prominent role in Arab affairs would dampen this divide and allow for more opportunities for sectarian
reconciliation.
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Egypt’s traditional emphasis on state-to-state relations as opposed to nonstate actors would also work
to the U.S. benefit. On the Syrian question, for example, it seeks to keep the Syrian state intact, also a U.S.
goal, when there are many calls for Syria to be divided
up, Balkan-style.77 It clearly wants ISIS defeated, but
also wants to ensure that the state survives and that
moderate forces come out on top.
On Yemen, Egypt is worried that Saudi Arabia is
supporting Sunni Islamist parties, such as al-Islah,
that are affiliated with the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood. One analyst has noted that despite Saudi largesse to Egypt:
Sisi has not been a strong supporter of the Saudi war
in Yemen, although Egypt remains formally part of
the Arab coalition. So far, the Egyptian president has
not publicly criticized the Saudis for working with the
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah Party. However, the authoritative Egyptian Al-Ahram Weekly reported in early June that this was one of the ‘bones
of contention’ between Cairo and Riyadh that also included Egypt’s opposition to a ground offensive. Sisi
himself has made clear indirectly his preference for a
political solution [italics in original].78

Although Sisi is not opposed in general to a ground
offensive in Yemen against the Houthi rebels, he does
not want Egyptian ground troops involved in that
country because of Egypt’s very troubled military intervention there in the 1960s, during which it suffered
thousands of casualties.
The Yemeni conflict has also brought into question
the efficacy of the United States relying on Saudi Arabia to take the lead in Arab affairs. Saudi air strikes
in Yemen have led to numerous civilian casualties
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and widespread condemnation from human rights
groups and the UN Secretary General himself. Of the
6,600 deaths in the Yemeni conflict from early 2015 to
August 2016, at least half have been civilians.79 After
peace talks between the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni
Government, held under Kuwaiti auspices, collapsed
in the summer of 2016, the Saudis again resumed air
strikes that again resulted in civilian casualties.
For example, in August 2016, Saudi warplanes hit
a hospital in Yemen that killed 19 people and injured
24. In response to such strikes, the United States has
withdrawn from Saudi Arabia a planning team that
was coordinating the Saudi and UAE air campaign
in Yemen and has moved it to Bahrain. A Pentagon
spokesperson said:
The cooperation we’ve extended to Saudi Arabia since
the conflict escalated again is modest and it is not a
blank check . . . at no point did US military personnel
provide direct or implicit approval of target selection
or prosecution.80

U.S. officials are worried that such strikes on civilian targets, even if unintentional, are sullying the
reputation of the United States in Yemen because of
close U.S.-Saudi ties. These U.S. officials also believe
that these strikes are hurting the fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS because these organizations have taken
advantage of the chaos in Yemen to make territorial
gains. This criticism has also come from Congress.
Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, for example,
has stated:
As I read the conflict in Yemen, I have a hard time
figuring out what the U.S. national security interests
are. . . . the result of the coalition campaign has been
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to kill a lot of civilians, has been to sow the seeds of
a humanitarian crisis, and to create space for these
groups—these extremists that we claim to be our priority in the region—to grow.81

Secretary of State Kerry responded to his remarks
by saying the United States had lent its support (reportedly logistics, intelligence, and refueling) to Saudi
Arabia because it was threatened by the Houthi rebels
in neighboring Yemen, but Kerry added that the United States would not reflexively support all of Saudi
Arabia’s proxy wars against Iran.82
Having Egypt play a more prominent defense role
in the Arab world could not only avoid some of the
pitfalls that Saudis have made in Yemen, but could
reassure other Arab states about their security, especially at a time when there is concern that the United
States is lessening its role in the region as it pivots to
Asia. Egypt is unlikely to be the “policeman” of the
Gulf, like the Shah of Iran was in the 1970s, and, for
political reasons, would not want to be seen doing
the U.S. bidding, but its longstanding ties to the Gulf
Arab states might mean they will rely more on Egypt
for their security than they have in the past. This does
not mean that the Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia
would want Egyptian troops stationed on their soil—
after the Gulf war of 1990-1991, the Saudis initially
agreed to have Egyptian and Syrian troops remain in
the kingdom as part of the so-called Damascus Declaration, but then had second thoughts about the idea
and ultimately reneged on it.83 However, in the present circumstances, the Saudis and other Gulf Arab
states might be amenable to more joint military exercises with the Egyptians as a way of enhancing their
security and preparing for the day when they might
call on Egypt to come to their defense again.
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On the other side of this ledger, there could be
downsides for the United States in the Arab leadership quest by Egypt. When Egypt feels that its national
security interests trumps the broader Arab consensus,
as in the case of Libya, it will pursue its own policies,
like supporting General Haftar even when most of the
Arab world, the United States, and the international
community want to support the Libyan national unity
government.84
Egypt is also likely to remain at odds with a few
Arab countries like Qatar and non-Arab countries like
Turkey who support Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the United States does
not see eye-to-eye with many of the positions of the
Brotherhood, it has not agreed to Egypt’s designation
of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and it
has criticized the draconian sentences issued against
Brotherhood activists in Egypt after quick trials. For
the time being, the United States and Egypt have
“agreed to disagree” on the Brotherhood’s designation, but lingering tensions remain about U.S. support for, or at least willingness to work with, what
the United States believes are non-violent Islamists.
The longstanding U.S. position, first articulated in
1992, is that it will work with any non-violent political
parties, secular or religious, in the Middle East that
come to power through free and fair elections.85 For
example, the United States worked with the moderate
Tunisian Islamist party, Ennahda, when it emerged as
the dominant party in Tunisia post-2011; and with the
secular-Ennahda alliance that emerged post-2013. The
United States also worked with then-president Morsi
of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012-2013 because he
was seen in Washington as a freely elected Egyptian
president.
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Nevertheless, the relationship between the United
States and Morsi was seen by many secular factions in
Egypt as some type of nefarious plot to weaken Egypt.
This opinion was held not only by high-ranking Egyptian officials and intellectuals, but also by ordinary
citizens. As outlandish as this opinion sounds to U.S.
ears, it was firmly and widely believed by large segments of the Egyptian polity.86
As mentioned earlier, it is highly doubtful that
Egypt under el-Sisi is going to change its position toward the Brotherhood, and Egypt has many allies in
the region that share similar views, like secularists in
North Africa and some leaders of the Gulf Arab states
like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait who also see
the Brotherhood as a threat. Therefore, from Egypt’s
perspective, there is little to gain and much to lose if
it changes its position on the Brotherhood, especially
since it sees the Brotherhood wanting to come back
to power someday and taking revenge on the military
establishment and other security forces.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Given the ongoing chaos in the region, longstanding ties between the United States and Egypt (despite the distrust over the last few years) and Egypt’s
moderate religious role, measured state policies, and
military professionalism, it is in the U.S. interest for
Egypt to again aspire to an Arab leadership role, even
though there will be some circumstances when Egypt
and the United States will not see eye-to-eye on issues.
However, in order to help Egypt play this leadership role, U.S. policy must change in some ways,
employing both the carrot and the stick. First, unless
there is concrete evidence that Egyptian military units
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are involved in human rights abuses, U.S. military assistance should not be suspended in the future. Such
punitive action does not change Egyptian behavior (in
terms of human rights) for the better, as was seen during 2013-2015, and merely contributes to the exacerbation of bilateral tensions that feed conspiracy theories.
Moreover, it is in the U.S. interest for the terrorist
insurgency in the Sinai to be reduced and hopefully
eliminated, and withholding military assistance does
neither of these things.
As for U.S. economic aid to Egypt, this figure has
dropped from about $800 million in the 1980s and
1990s to about $150 million today on an annual basis. Because of Egyptian government prohibitions,
there is now a backlog of unspent U.S. economic aid
amounting to $500 to $700 million, because much of
it was slated for programs like democracy promotion
and support for Egyptian NGOs, which Egyptian officials held up because they claimed it was interfering
in their country’s internal affairs.87
U.S. policymakers should re-think the make-up of
U.S. economic assistance to Egypt and consider substantially boosting this amount, possibly to the original amount of $800 million a year.
Such funds should be spent on badly needed infrastructure projects that would have a three-fold benefit. It would improve the image of the United States
in Egypt by demonstrating to the people that U.S. assistance is being spent on something tangible, such
as roads, bridges, schools, etc. (as opposed to the current U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) practice of supporting development assistance
for training programs that have political implications
and are not seen by the average citizen), would avoid
the charge that U.S. aid is being spent on superfluous
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things or being pocketed by government officials, and
would bring jobs to Egypt, at least over the short-term,
as infrastructure projects need construction workers,
architects, and engineers. U.S. and Egyptian officials
should work together to identity infrastructure needs.
When Egyptian Government officials and ordinary citizens see U.S. tax dollars being used in this way it will
likely have the added benefit of making U.S.-Egyptian
cooperation on regional issues more acceptable.
In addition, because of the socio-economic problems facing the Bedouin in the North Sinai, which
feeds the terrorist insurgency there, a concerted effort should be made to develop projects that would
improve the lives of the people living in the region.
In 2016, Saudi King Salman announced that he would
be giving $1.5 billion for such Sinai projects.88 Hence,
this is an opportunity for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
United States to all work together to see what projects
would be most beneficial in helping to reduce poor
socio-economic conditions adversely affecting the
Bedouin population and give Bedouin youth alternatives to joining terrorist groups such as Wilayat Sinai,
which is affiliated with ISIS.
Although some observers may believe that in this
time of U.S. budgetary retrenchment, a significant
boost in U.S. economic aid to Egypt from $150 million
to $800 million annually is not realistic, a compelling
case can be made to the U.S. Congress that such assistance would be in the national security interests of
the United States for the reasons mentioned earlier.
In fact, there is indeed growing support in Congress
for Egypt. El-Sisi’s comments about an Islamic reform
effort were well received on Capitol Hill, and many
members are sympathetic to Egypt’s ongoing struggle
against terrorism.
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The impediment to boost aid for Egypt in Congress
has been Egypt’s poor human rights record. As U.S.
Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina stated candidly after a trip to Egypt in 2016: “We need to think
broadly as a nation about some kind of Marshall Plan
for front-line states,” like Egypt. Graham added that if
el-Sisi “did something that would be seen by me and
others as a real serious move on the [human] rights
front, it makes it easier for a guy like me to help.”89
This situation presents an opportunity for U.S. officials to pursue a policy of promising to offer positive
incentives. U.S. policymakers can present the case to elSisi and other Egyptian officials that if they ease up on
repression and make improvements on human rights,
Congress will be more willing to come to Egypt’s
aid with substantial economic assistance. Moreover,
the U.S. administration, including President Trump,
can say if such improvements were indeed carried
through, el-Sisi would then be able to receive a White
House invitation and also hold meetings in Congress.
Although el-Sisi and other Egyptian officials may
bristle about any conditionality on aid, positive conditionality with a very prideful country like Egypt
has a much better chance of working than negative
conditionality (which has been tried and failed when
the United States suspended most military assistance
to Egypt in October 2013). In addition, el-Sisi understands that his arrest campaign against dissidents and
journalists has not only had negative ramifications
for Egypt’s image abroad but also at home. In a wideranging interview that he gave in August 2016, el-Sisi
stated that he planned to pardon about 300 detainees,
including those arrested for protesting as well as journalists.90 The 300-figure is only a small fraction of all
those incarcerated in Egypt for political offensives,
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but would be a good first step if indeed it were carried
through.
Having a less repressive Egypt would make it easier for the United States to help encourage Egypt to
play a regional leadership role that could lead to more
cooperation between the two countries on regional
security issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
An Egyptian leadership role in the region would
necessitate the Egyptian military being more active
outside its borders than it has been in recent years.
This does not mean that it will become engaged in
regional conflicts militarily, though that is a possibility, but it does mean that Egypt will be more active
in assessing strategic threats to the Arab world and
devising plans with Arab partners on how best it can
mitigate such threats.
In the past, when Egypt was the leader or aspired
to be the leader of the Arab world, it did deploy
troops outside its borders when those of its allies were
threatened. For example, in 1961, Egypt, which had
bad relations with Iraq at the time, along with Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and a few other Arab countries, as part
of an Arab League contingent, sent troops to Kuwait
(which had just received independence from Britain)
in response to Iraqi threats to take over that country.
Similarly, Egypt and several other Arab countries also
sent troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD
and took part in the liberation of Kuwait in Operation
DESERT STORM in 1991. The Egyptian force of 30,000
soldiers was the largest of the Arab expeditionary
armies in Saudi Arabia.
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The 1990-1991 operations were coordinated closely
with the U.S. Army, which had provided the bulk of
troops to defend Saudi Arabia and eventually liberate
Kuwait.
Although it is difficult to speculate on what possible contingencies are likely to arise where Egypt
might deploy troops again, Egypt is likely to engage
in more military exercises with Arab allies if it succeeds in its leadership quest. Although, as mentioned
earlier, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states will
probably remain skittish about any permanent stationing of Egyptian troops on their soil. However,
they may be amenable to more joint military exercises
with Egypt as a warning to Iran not to mount any actions against Saudi Arabia and as a way to bolster the
interoperability of forces in case a military threat does
indeed materialize.91
The U.S. Army can play a role in these endeavors
by reinstituting the Bright Star military exercises on
Egyptian territory that were held on a biennial basis
before political issues between Egypt and the United
States made these exercises problematic. Although
the decision to restart Bright Star will likely have to
be made by the U.S. President, the U.S. Army will be
the leading component of the armed services planning
and executing such exercises. Arab countries friendly
with Egypt, as in the past, should be invited to participate in Bright Star; and similar exercises, with an
Egyptian leading component, and should be held in
other Arab countries.
Given the close relations between the Egyptian
and U.S. Armies, not only can U.S. Army officers play
a role in discussing contingencies with their Egyptian
counterparts, but they can also shape military exercises to deal with such contingencies. Such cooperation
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will likely lead to even closer contacts between these
armies, and U.S. Army officers should do what they
can, given the nature of restrictions imposed by the
Egyptian military, in maintaining contacts with their
Egyptian army counterparts in case a regional crisis
breaks out, necessitating joint U.S.-Egyptian coordination like what occurred in the Gulf war of 1990-1991.
On the other hand, U.S. Army officers should be
wary of Egyptian requests for assistance when dealing with issues that buck the consensus of the international community and the Arab world. For example,
even though Egyptian officials have stated publicly
that they support the concept of a unified Libyan government, the Egyptian military, as mentioned earlier,
is reportedly providing some assistance to Libyan
strongman General Khalifa Haftar who is opposed
to unity between the Tobruk faction in Libya, that he
supports, and the Tripoli faction, which he opposes.
Although it would be important for U.S. Army officers to ascertain the Egyptian army’s motives and
plans for assisting Haftar in eastern Libya, it would
not be prudent of them to pass along information
that would somehow enable Haftar to succeed as
the strongman of eastern Libya, as that would prolong Libya’s factionalism and perhaps delay the fight
against remaining ISIS elements in the country.
In other matters, if Egypt is successful in ending
the terrorist insurgency in the Sinai, then its counterterrorism units, with help from U.S. Special Operations Forces, can jointly advise other Arab countries
about similar terrorist problems. Although the Egyptian military was initially reluctant to take U.S. counterterrorism advice, this reticence seems to be changing, making such joint briefings possible.92
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Recent battlefield successes against ISIS in both
Syria and Iraq has emboldened the model of current
U.S. counterterrorism strategy of deploying U.S. Special Operations Forces to assist indigenous forces fighting against a terrorist insurgency, backed by U.S. air
power. If U.S.-Egyptian relations continue to improve
and Egypt wants to exert leadership in the region,
Egypt might want to send its own special operations
forces to help other Arab countries in this way, as that
would boost its reputation as a reliable partner. Such
a scenario would enable U.S. Army Special Forces to
work closely with their Egyptian counterparts to advise them on particular tactics that have proved successful in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Although Egypt is likely to stay away from the
Iraqi and Syrian situations for both political and historical reasons, it may consider deploying some of its
own special forces, on a limited basis, to other Arab
countries if asked, and U.S. Special Forces should be
ready to assist. For example, if the two main Libyan
factions do indeed unite and Egypt comes around and
supports a unity government, it could send, with Libya’s acquiescence, its special forces to Libya to assist
U.S. efforts in that country to degrade and ultimately
defeat ISIS. Having an Arab partner in this or similar
endeavors would also make the U.S. role less controversial.
Finally, if Egypt does expand the number of cadets
from other Arab countries in its military academies as
part of its Arab leadership role, such a policy would
be beneficial to the U.S.-Egyptian partnership because
much of the Egyptian officer corps is U.S.-trained
(having attended specialized military colleges and
professional military education (PME) institutions in
the United States). U.S. Army officers might be able
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to give guest lectures at Egyptian military academies
on tactics and best practices against terrorist groups.
Moreover, some of the Arab cadets, having attended
Egyptian military academies, could then come to the
United States for their post-graduate or mid-career
training, and this would further their understanding
of U.S. military doctrine and tactics, which would enhance cooperation in future military contingencies.
A low-key U.S.-Egyptian military partnership that
might arise from an Egyptian regional leadership role,
involving primarily army components—particularly
Special Forces—from both countries would benefit
both the United States and Egypt. It could help stabilize the Middle East region, bring Egypt gratitude
and financial assistance from its wealthier neighbors,
and eventually lessen the U.S. military footprint in the
region, which would be advantageous to the United
States for both political and economic reasons. But if
a major crisis again arises in the Persian Gulf region,
requiring substantial U.S. and Egyptian troops, then
such cooperation would make the defense of the
region all the more manageable.
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